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ABSTRACT 
This essay surveys some of the crucial issues about language over which generative 
linguists and analytic philosophers have been disagreeing over the past thirty years, given 
that they undertake the task of analyzing language with different assumptions and goals 
in mind. Chomsky has been criticized by philosophers on several fronts, and the topics 
here discussed, such as the concept of meaning, the psychological reality of mental 
representations, or the view of language as innate structures as opposed to a learning 
process are all different aspects of the one issue at the core of their debate: the need to 
recur to a system of mental representations in order to explain language facts. For 
generative linguists language is indeed a system of mental representations; for 
philosophers, however, a language is a sum of actual or potential speech events, and the 
notion of internalized mental representations is really an unnecessary burden on any 
language theory. 
As its somewhat cryptic title suggests, the present paper is an attempt to survey some of 
the major points of friction between analytic philosophers of language such as Quine and 
linguists within the Chomskian tradition. The title is a playful echo of W. V. Quine's 
statements in connection with generative grammar, a theory which he has called 
"enigmatic doctrine", and against which he has argued, as we shall see, using the now 
frequently quoted example of a rabbit as "an aggregate of rabbit parts" (Quine, "Meaning 
and Translation" 143). Most of the crucial issues involved in the debate between linguists 
and philosophers have been directly addressed by Chomsky and Quine in their own 
writings, their discussions focusing at points on terminological minutiae which seem to 
require endless clarifications and explanations. Leaving technicalities aside, the main 
issues are clear enough, and even a brief survey of them can tell us a great deal about the 
different assumptions and goals which philosophers and linguists bring into an apparently 
common fíeld of study: language. 
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Why and how are philosophers interested in the study of language? There have always 
been several áreas within philosophy in which a concern with language has occurred, as 
in metaphysics, Iogic, or epistemology. More specifically, philosophy must concéntrate on 
language whenever it deals with conceptual analysis, and this has actually been a major 
concern in philosophy in this century, after the rise of the British school of analytic 
philosophy which brought about the so-called linguistic turn in philosophy. Its basic tenet 
was that philosophical problems should be approached and analyzed in terms of the 
language used to formúlate them. It thus became crucial for philosophers to proceed on the 
basis of some general conception of the nature of language, some understanding of the 
nature of linguistic use and meaning. Experts in the field recognize that the philosophy of 
language is "even less well-defined and less in possession of a clear principie of unity than 
most other branches of philosophy" (Alston 1). In general, philosophers of language have 
been primarily concerned with semantic concepts such as meaning, the relation between 
meaning and referent, or the connection between language in the mind and the external 
world. Although both philosophers and linguists argüe that a theory of meaning must at 
least provide an account of the relation between linguistic structure and the external world, 
"opinions diverge widely on what methods it should employ and on the question whether 
it should incorpórate or even be identífied with a theory of language understanding to 
provide an explanation of language behaviour" (Meuten 430). 
H. P. Grice's well-known proposal to define meaning in terms of use, the meaning of 
a linguistic expression thus reduced to a summary of its uses, is a typical example of the 
philosopher's attempt to obvíate the need for internal representations—the issue at the core 
of the debate between philosophers and linguists. The origin of this use-theory of language 
goes back to Wittgenstein, who argued for a careful analysis of how words are used in 
their everyday appearance in human interaction. For him, the equation "meaning is use" 
was undeniable, since the meaning of a word is its use in language: " . . . doesn't the fact 
that sentences have the same sense consist in their having the same use?" (Wittgenstein 
10). In a seminal article back in the late 1950's, Grice offered a proposal in line with 
Wittgenstein's conception of meaning as use. He made the primary intention of the utterer 
relevant to the meaning of an utterance, and he summed up what is necessary for A to 
mean something by X as follows: "A must intend to induce by X a belief in the audience, 
and he also must intend his utterance to be recognized as so intended. But these intentions 
are not independent; the recognition is intended by A to play its part in inducing the belief, 
and if it does not do so, something will have gone wrong with the fulfillment of A's 
intentions" (Grice 383). 
According to linguists, however, Grice's definition of meaning in terms of speakers' 
intentions cannot hold. Paul Ziff indicates that Grice seems to have confused "A meant 
something by uttering X" with the quite different "A meant something by X." For Grice, 
"A meant something by X" is equivalent to "A intended the utterance of X to produce 
some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention." Ziff's argument 
against Grice uses the following example: George has been inducted into the army and 
compelled to take a test to establish his sanity. George is an irritable academic who 
despises the military, and he answers one of the test questions ("What would you say if 
you were asked to identify yourself?") with (1): 
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(1) Ugh ugh blugh blugh ugh blug blug 
According to Grice's definition of meaning, George did mean something by (1): he 
intended the utterance of (1) to produce an effect in his audience by means of the 
recognition of his intention. The effect he intended was that of offending his audience. But 
even though it is clear that George meant something by uttering (1), "it is equally clear," 
as Ziff indicates, "that (1) did not mean anything. Indeed, had (1) meant anything, that 
would have defeated George's purpose in uttering (1)" (Ziff 3). Ziff insists that to be 
concerned with speakers' intentions when they utter an expression is to be concerned with 
its use, and the use of an expression is determined by several factors, among which, some 
have nothing to do with meaning. At a more general level, reducing meaning to intentions 
does not help in the desire to do away with mental representations: we get rid of mental 
images but we introduce intentions. 
Although Quine does not subscribe the Austinian notion of meaning-as-use, both he 
and Grice belong with many others in the tradition of Wittgenstein and Austin in their 
opposition to denotative theories of meaning, which postúlate that the meaning of a Word 
is an object, or thing, or entity. But these philosophers offer an equally virulent attack on 
what Quine calis the "pernicious mentalism" of generative grammar, as represented in the 
área of meaning by what Quine labels the Museum Myth, i.e. the notion that meaning 
involves something prívate to an individual, a mental image. Two representative examples 
of philosophers' arguments against mental representations in meaning are Hilary Putnam's 
"división of labor" and W. V. Quine's "indeterminacy of translation." 
Hilary Putnam refutes any theory of meaning in which a sufficient condition for 
acquiring the meaning of a word is associating it with the right concept. In his view, 
meaning cannot be identified with intensión, "if intensión is anything like an individual 
speaker 's concept" (Putnam 264). The reason? His much-discussed "división of linguistic 
labor": in the language of a given individual, many words are semantically indeterminate, 
since their extensión is fixed by the community, including experts, through a complex 
cooperative process; extensión, then, is determined socially, not by individual competence 
alone, and thus the psychological state of the individual speaker does not determine what 
he means. Semantic structure must therefore be regarded as a social rather than as a 
psychological fact. 
For Chomsky, however, Putman's "división of linguistic labor" is not a valid argument 
against mental representations. If a person is unsure of the exact reference of the words 
"yawl" and "ketch," for instance, he will refer to experts to sharpen or fix their reference. 
The study of language Chomsky proposes allows for the possibility that the individual's 
state of knowledge may itself include some kind of reference to the social nature of 
language: "in the lexicón of a person's language, the entries for 'yawl' and 'ketch' will 
be specified to the extent of his or her knowledge, with an indication that the details are 
to be filled in by others" (Chomsky, Knowledge 8). That is, it is true, as Putnam suggests, 
that each of us will have to resort to experts to explain the meaning of words we do not 
fully understand, but, for Chomsky, the only conclusión we can reach from this fact is that 
each person has an internalized grammar which leaves certain questions open. Further-
more, as he indicates in Rules and Representations, it is highly ironic that Putnam should 
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reject the Museum Myth and yet have no qualms about accepting as plausible the 
conclusión that the brain stores images which share share fundamental properties with 
pictorial representations (Chomsky, Rules 18). 
In a similar vein, Quine also urges us to reject the myth that words ñame speciruen 
mental objects, and his attack of the Museum Myth, a typical instance of the argument 
against mental representations, is articulated on the basis of his famous statement of the 
problem of translation, what he calis, "indeterminacy of translation," which applies not 
only to translations between languages but to one's own language. Quine sets a scenario 
for his argument: 
Imagine a newly discovered tribe whose language is without known affinities. The 
linguist has to learn the language directly by observing what the natives say under 
observed circumstances, encountered or contrived . . . The utterances fírst and most 
accurately translated in such a case are perforce reports of observations conspicuously 
shared by the linguist and his infonnant. A rabbit scurries by, the native says 'gavagai,' 
and our jungle linguist notes down the sentence 'Rabbit' (or 'Lo, a rabbit1) as tentative 
translation. (Quine, "Speaking of Objects" 5) 
As Quine further develops the scenario, we have a linguist who repeats the procedure on 
several occasions for different rabbits in varied attitudes and under different circumstances. 
The linguist is therefore led to the conclusión that the word "gavagai" means "rabbit" for 
the native of this tribe. This is indeed the accepted scientific method. Quine, however, 
poses the question of behavioral evidence: we have no behavioral evidence to show 
whether a word such as "gavagai" stands for the concept of rabbit. For Quine the key issue 
is that it may be the case that this concept does not exist in this tribe's language—for all 
we know, they may instead think of the animal as an aggregate of independent, although 
attached, rabbit parts. Therefore, Quine's argument goes, since we have no definite proof 
that a native means "rabbit," and not "aggregate of rabbit parts," when he says "gavagai," 
it makes no sense to construct a theory of language that postulates the existence of a 
concept "rabbit"—the behavioral evidence is equally compatible with a theory in which 
we postúlate the concept "aggregate rabbit parts." 
In Chomsky's view, however, it is implausible to say of another person, whether in 
ours or in another culture, that he means undetached rabbit parts when he uses the term 
"rabbit." For him, the reason is straightforward enough. We know of ourselves that we 
mean rabbit and not undetached rabbit parts, and "we assume that the next person is like 
us in relevant ways, unless we have evidence to the contrary, just as the chemist who 
analyzes two samples from the same solution assumes, unless there is evidence to the 
contrary, that they are the same in relevant respects, or just as a geneticist assumes with 
regard to two fruitflies" (Chomsky, Rules 21; emphasís mine). It is true that there are ways 
to make all the behavioral evidence compatible with innumerable other interpretations, but 
this is the problem of underdetermination by evidence common to all scientific theories. 
In fact, what Quine's indeterminacy of translation implies is that in the área of linguistics, 
and cognitive science in general, the underdetermination by evidence of a theory is enough 
to question its validity. That is, 
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psychology has been asked to confront questions that are simply dismissed in the case 
of the natural sciences, where no one is much concerned with the fact that two samples 
might in principie be differently constituted, that theories are underdetermined by 
evidence and so on. (Chomsky, Rules 22) 
This refusal to see underdetermination in the same light across scientific endeavors is 
what Donald Hockey has called "the bifurcation thesis": psychology seems to face a 
problem of indeterminacy which is qualitatively different in some way from the 
underdetermination in the natural sciences. The typical objection to Chomsky's approach 
represented, for instance, in J. F. M. Hunter's Wittgensteinian argument in his article "On 
How We Talk" would never be raised against an abstract model in physics. His argument, 
common to most philosophers dealing with language, is that it does not follow from 
descriptive or predictive success that the principies postulated are the correct ones. Or, as 
Quine puts it, if two grammar genérate the same language, it is senseless to say that one 
of them might be right and the other wrong. 
Quine thinks of the generative linguist's concern with mental representations as an 
added burden which raises the problem of evidence "whereby to decide, or conjecture, 
which of the two extensionally equivalent systems of rules has been implicitly guiding the 
native's verbal behavior" (Quine, "Methodologcal Reflections" 444). As in the case of 
meaning, he argües that the indeterminacy of translation invalidates any theoretical move 
which postulates some kind of mental representation as the correct one. The insuperable 
problem of underdetermination affecting all aspects of language and grammar implies, 
according to Quine, that there is no sense to the construction of a theory of language and 
mind which tries to establish, for instance, that the rules of grammar assign phrase 
structure in one or another way in mental representations. In Quine's view, if we have two 
extensionally equivalent systems of grammar for a language, i.e. two systems that provide 
equivalent recursive definitions of well-formed string, then even if "the enigmatic doctrine 
under consideration says that one of the analyses is right and the other wrong," (Quine, 
"Methodological Reflections" 448; emphasis mine) both are equally correct. English 
speakers obey, in this sense, "any and all of the extensionally equivalent systems of 
grammar that demárcate the right totality of well-formed English sentences" (Quine, 
"Methodological Reflections" 444). 
For Quine, language is what Chomsky would cali "externalized language" ("E-lan-
guage"), the actual or potential speech events. If we think of language as the sum of these 
speech events, grammar is then a derivative notion, a function that enumerates the 
elements of the E-language, and the linguist is thus free to choose one grammar or another, 
as long as it correctly identifies this E-language. Knowledge of language would then be 
a capacity or ability to do something, a system of dispositions of some kind, and behavior 
would provide a criterion for the possession of knowledge. Chomsky's work, on the other 
hand, represents precisely a delibérate shift from the study of behavior and its products to 
the study of states of the mind/brain that enter into behavior. A grammar is then a theory 
of the "internalized language" ("I-language"), i.e. a theory of the system of mental 
representations and computation in the mind of the perscn who knows the language, and 
questions of truth and falsity are as pertinent for grammar as they are for any scientific 
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theory. If two grammars G and G' of an I-language yield the same judgement of 
grammaticality or form-meaning correspondence, one may certainly be chosen over the 
other as factually correct. Theory G' might, for instance, contain superfluous rules, or not 
conform to a theory of Universal Grammar which is verified for other languages, or be in 
conflict with some relevant evidence from the brain sciences. In short, any kind of 
evidence is used to select the more elegant, deeper, and more empirically adequate 
theory—in this case, G. In the rare case that the theories coincide on all the evidence 
(Quine's extensionally equivalent grammars), linguists rely on concepts of simplicity, 
insight and explanatory power to choose one of them. As Chomsky indicates, "this is just 
standard scientific practice" (Chomsky, Knowledge 250). 
Philosophers, however, object to the use of this standard scientific practice when it 
comes to problems in the cognitive sciences, and are relunctant to adopt the "realist" 
assumptions of the natural sciences in the study of language. Even if the rule of movement, 
the principies of opacity and locality, and other representations proposed by Chomsky 
successfully explain facts, and even if by assuming the elements of this structure to be 
innate we can explain how children can reach the conclusions they reach when presented 
with linguistic information as they acquire language, still the theories so constructed are 
regarded with suspicion by philosophers if offered as theories with truth claims. It is 
frequently said that they lack "psychological reality"—yet another variant of the argument 
against imputing existence to the structure whose properties are characterized by particular 
grammars or universal grammars. 
Sapir's discussion of the psychological reality of the phoneme is an early example of 
a linguistic analysis subsequently criticized for its claims to "reality." Sapir considered 
both linguistic and psychological evidence, and reached the conclusión that his theoretical 
constructions had "psychological reality"; he offered them thus as psychological real 
entities rather than as mere fictions convenient for some purpose. The general reaction to 
his claim is already familiar: his belief in the reality of the phoneme was immediately 
attacked. The generative linguist is often under attack for similar reasons—his way of 
demonstrating the reality of his constructs is not convincing enough for scholars who 
demand in psychology a stricter set of proofs than in the physical sciences. As Chomsky 
indicates, in his investigation of the language faculty the linguist observes what people say 
and do, and then he tries to devise a theory of some depth and significance. He tests his 
theory by its success in providing explanations for selected phenomena. When he is 
challenged to prove that these constructions have psychological reality, he can only repeat 
the evidence and the proposed explanations. He interprets "psychological reality" as 
nothing more than "truth, in a certain domain," and behaves like a scientist in the natural 
sciences, where he would never be asked whether the best theory he can devise in some 
idealized domain has the property of "physical reality." 
Chomsky reminds us that in the natural sciences we seem to have no alternative but 
to pursue what Husserl called the "Galilean style" in physics, that is, making abstract 
mathematical models of the universe to which the physicists give a higher degree of reality 
than they accord to the ordinary world of sensation. Chomsky 's endeavor moves in the 
same direction. He tries to discover to what extent research in the Galilean style can give 
us an understanding of the roots of human nature in the cognitive domain. He is therefore 
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interested in pursuing the study of mind, especially "such aspects as lend themselves to 
inquiry through the construction of abstract explanatory theories that may involve 
substantial idealization and will be justified, if at all, by success in providing insights and 
explanations" (Chomsky, Rules 11). 
On Chomsky's theory, we can propose that rule R is a constituent element of Jones's 
language (I-language) if the best model we have which deals with all the relevant evidence 
assigns R as a constituent element of the language. And we can say that Jones follows R 
if, in this best theory, our account of his doing such-and-such (e.g. assigning an 
interpretation to the sentence "Who was persuaded to like them?") makes use of R as a 
constituent of his language. These assumptions, and the basic assumption that psychologi-
cal explanation is part of the natural sciences as far as rule following is concerned, are 
controversial for philosophers. According to Quine, Chomskian linguistics is an enigmatic 
doctrine, perhaps folly; in his view, we can legitimately speak of guiding only when rules 
are consciously applied to cause behavior—which is not what happens with language. 
When there is not this causal relation, we can only speak of behavior as "fitting" one or 
another system of rules. Bodies obey, according to Quine, the law of falling bodies, but 
English speakers obey any one of the grammatical systems which can account for the 
totality of well-formed English sentences. In Chomsky's view, Quine's comparison is 
irrelevant, since it merely amounts to saying that 
English speakers obey any and all of the extensionally equivalent systems of grammar 
that demárcate the right totality of well-formed English sentences, in the sense in which 
bodies obey any and all of the extensionally equivalent theories that demárcate some set 
of arbitrarily selected proper subpart of the evidence relevant to physics. (Chomsky, 
Language 258) 
For Chomsky, attributing causal efficacy to the rules amounts to nothing more than the 
claim that these rules are constituent elements of the states postulated in an explanatory 
theory of behavior: we conclude that Jones is following R on the grounds that the best 
theory account for Jones's behavior includes R as an operative rule. 
For many philosophers, in order to prove that a person is following rule R, it must be 
shown that the content of the rule plays a causal role in the production of rule-governed 
behavior. As Searle points out, it is not enough to get rules that have the right predictive 
power; there must be some independent reason for supposing that the rules are functioning 
causally. This is why many philosophers insist that the speaker should be aware of it for 
something to count as a rule, and go to the extreme of saying that "we can say that 
someone follows a rule only if he knows what the rule is and can tell us what it is" 
(Cooper 145). Or, in Quine's words, "the behavior is not guided by the rule unless the 
behaver knows the rule and can state it" (Quine, "Methodological Reflections" 442). It is 
common among philosophers to claim with Searle that in order for the attribution of 
unconscious mental states to be legitimate, this attribution must presuppose that the states 
can become conscious; a condition of adequacy for any theory purporting to state the rules 
is, for philosophers, that the speaker must be in principie capable of being aware of how 
the rules enter into behavior. 
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Searle indicates that speakers of English do not recognize the rules of generative 
grammar as being those they follow, and he claims that generative rules are too abstract 
and complicated, lacking the intuitive plausibility that ordinary grammar-books have. 
Chomsky agrees that grammar-book rules are easier to grasp, but this is the case precisely 
because they represent the idiosyncrasies of languages, the peculiar elements which could 
not be known without experience and instruction. They describe, in a way, the most 
intuitively outstanding phenomena that we perceive about language—which are not 
precisely the most interesting facts for the generative linguist studying the language 
faculty. No grammar-book will present rules describing, for instance, the use of reciprocáis 
in English, because they are rules we take for granted. Good traditional grammars will say 
very little about general properties of language; they discuss irregularities, not deeper 
principies of universal grammar: these principies are automaticaliy used by any speaker, 
and therefore they receive no particular attention in our daily lives. 
To know a language is, for Chomsky, to have a certain mental structure consisting of 
a system of rules and principies which genérate and relate mental representations of 
various types. For the most part, one cannot become aware that one knows these rules and 
principies, or determine by introspection that they hold. Chomsky uses the term "cognize" 
to refer to our knowledge of the language principies: in the case of the English sentences 
(2) and (3) we "cognize" their interpretations. 
(2) I wonder who [the men expected to see thern] 
(3) The men expected to see them 
In (2) the pronoun "them" may be referentially dependent on "the men," but not in the 
identical sentence in (3). We can say with Chomsky that the speakers cognize the facts of 
referential dependence because their language (I-language) provides representations (i) and 
(ii) for (2) and (3) respectively, and contains the principie of binding theory and those 
governing empty categories. 
(i) I wonder [who the men expected [e to see them]] 
(Ii) The men expected [PRO to see them] 
In this case, the speakers cognize the facts and also the system of mentally represented 
rules from which the facts follow. We might say that "cognization" is unconscious or 
implicit knowledge. It is therefore correct to say (a) that the speakers know/cognize the 
rules at work in (2) and (3)—they understand the sentences correctly. It would be wrong 
to say (b) that they know that the rules hold. 
Clearly, Searle and other philosophers insist that (a) and (b) should both hold for any 
talk of rule to make sense. If the speaker who cognizes the grammar and its rules could 
miraculously become aware of them, these philosophers would not hesitate to say that he 
knows the grammar and its rules, and that this conscious knowledge constitutes his 
knowledge of the language. Given that the knowledge of rules is implicit, however, 
philosophers cannot accept it as such. The crucial role given by linguists to unconscious 
structures across languages makes philosophers extremely uneasy, since they tend to think 
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of language as something taught and learned, a system of habits and skills acquired 
gradually through generalization, conditioning, induction and abstraction, and thus they 
frequently express qualms concerning explanations that rely on postulated innate 
structures. 
Philosophers naturally agree with a Piagetian visión of the child's initial state as a 
basic system of procedures of segmentation, classification, generalization and induction 
which are applied to the data of experience to yield a grammar; general principies of 
learning will thus underline all cognitive systems, and the various cognitive structures 
develop in a uniform way. For Chomsky, on the other hand, the child's genetically 
determined state is a rich system of principies that specify the range of possible grammars; 
the relation between experience and knowledge will be quite abstract. Chomsky insists 
that, for all we know, children learn from positive evidence only, and they appear to know 
the relevant facts without the appropriate experience in many complex cases. Postulating 
rich innate structures seems the most plausible solution to Plato's problem of "poverty of 
stimulus," i.e. the problem of how human beings, whose contacts with the world are brief 
and personal and limited, are able to know as much as they do. In the case of language, 
Plato's problem arises when we see that in an extremely short time, and on the basis of a 
limited number of heard utterances, the child becomes a master of language. It is difficult 
to believe that he could have obtained this mastery by only generalizing from that very 
small sample of language he has been offered. Such as Chomsky sees it, "it would be as 
if someone could become a chess-master as a result of having watched just one or two 
games of chess. So one is strongly tempted to suggest that the wide gap between input and 
output must be bridged by ascribing to the child a rich innate component" (Chomsky, 
Language 24). For Chomsky, children's language is a clear example of Plato's poverty of 
stimulus, since children at a very young age already have "a rich system of knowledge that 
extends far beyond any specific instruction, or experience more generally" (Davies 78). 
For him, the answer to Plato's problem in the field of language is very clearly that innate 
factors permit the organism to transcend experience, reaching a high level of complexity 
which does not reflect the limited environment. 
Philosophers try to explain language in dispositional and other terms more closely 
related to actual behavior than unconscious knowledge is. Language is for them, as Quine 
indicates, "a social art which we all acquire on the evidence only of other people's overt 
behavior under publicly recognizable circumstances" (Quine, "Inscrutability" 142). Theirs 
is the position of the empiricist: language is essentially an adventitious construct, taught 
by conditioning (Quine, just like Skinner), or by drill and explicit explanation (Wittgens-
tein), but relatively independent in its structure of any innate mental faculties. Chomsky, 
on the other hand, finds that no extensión of the empiricist model can give a satisfactory 
solution to Plato's problem, and therefore pursues the hypothesis that some aspects of the 
study of mind lend themselves to inquiry in the Galilean style. The language faculty is for 
Chomky a distinct system of the mind/brain, with an initial state S0 (common to all 
species) consisting of a system of principies associated with certain parameters of variatíon 
and a markedness system. To know a language is to be in a certain state of the language 
faculty Sx; this state is attained by setting parameters of S0 in one of the permissible ways 
on the basis of linguistic experience. 
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For Chomsky, then, linguistics is the branch of psychology which deals with one 
specifíc cognitive domain, the language faculty, and linguistics as the study of I-language 
and S0 will thus be incorporated within the natural siences in so far as we discover 
mechanisms which have the properties proposed by linguists. The main thrust of 
Chomsky's theory comes from his opposition to the oíd conception that the producís of our 
mind (language being one) are made by men and therefore accessible to an approach quite 
different from that of the natural sciences. Chomsky firmly believes that the human mind 
must begin to be analyzed following the methods and principies of the natural sciences, 
and if we hope to assímilate the study of human intelligence and its producís to the natural 
sciences insofar as possible and to learn something about nature in this way, we should 
devote attention to those domains in which rich and complex mental structures arise under 
minimal exposure to the environment. For Chomsky, language is certainly a striking 
example. 
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